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ABSTRACT
Regulatory agencies intervene in risky situations by outlawing practices lhat impose
risks on society or by proscribing practices lhat reduce risk. Because public resources
for enforcing regulation are limited, public policy has recently emphasized maximiz-
ing the benefit from enforcement by considering the risk reduction achievable from
each intervention. This emphasis requires a shift of resources to monitoring situa-
tions in which regulatory violations are most likely, their welfare effects are most
serious, and iheir detection is probable and relatively inexpensive. This article is a
risk-based monitoring mode! applied to the Food and Drug Administralion's (FDA)
import monitoring program. Although some components of the model are specific to
FDA's data and regulatory needs, this model's basic structure is applicable to many
situations in which a decisionmaker seeks to identify the most cost-effective choices
for reducing risk.
INTRODUCTION
Every day individuals make choices affecting their risk of injury,
illness, and death. In most cases, we choose to reduce our risk rather
than eliminate it because eliminating risk is costly in terms of time,
money, and opportunity to enjoy life. Thus, we generally choose to
reduce our risks within some set of budgetary, time or consumption
constraints.
When individuals have neither the information nor the resources
to control risks from foods, products or drugs, regulatory agencies
often provide assistance. These agencies intervene in risky situations
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related to the workplace or the environment by either deeming
certain practices illegal or proscribing practices to reduce risk. They
monitor compliance and apply appropriate enforcement measures to
increase the effectiveness of their intervention. However, because
public resources for enforcing regulations are limited, full compli-
ance with regulations affecting risk cannot be assured. Thus, just as
individuals face resource constraints in reducing risk, regulatory
agencies need to maximize the benefit from limited resources spent
on regulatory intervention.
The cost-effective ness of regulatory monitoring can be maxi-
mized by choosing to monitor situations based on the potential
benefit (avoiding injury or loss), cost of monitoring, and the agency's
resource constraints. Toward this end, many regulatory agencies
concentrate monitoring on situations in which violations are most
likely to occur, their welfare effects are most serious, and their
detection is probable and relatively inexpensive.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is one of many
agencies that perform this type of regulatory monitoring. FDA is
responsible for enforcing the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
(FD&C) Act and its subsequent amendments which mandate that
the nation's food be unadulterated, uncontaminated with harmful
chemicals or biological substances, and of sufficient quality. FDA's
food safety and quality enforcement program, including its import
monitoring program, is designed to prevent domestic and imported
products that violate requirements of the FD&C Act from reaching
the consumer.
The cost-effectiveness of FDA's import monitoring program
might be improved by employing an objective and consistent risk-
based method. Currently, inspectors at ports of entry must decide
which food to sample and determine the violation for which they
should test the samples. The inspectors typically follow an annual
sampling program that targets a number of samples in certain food
categories to be tested for different types of violations. The inspec-
tors choose food lots based on the requirements of the annual
sampling program and information available about the specific food
lots entering the port that day. While the current system includes
some consideration of risk, it does not systematically consider all
available information regarding the risks presented to consumers by
a given shipment of food relative to other shipments.
This article describes a model that incorporates the relative
benefits and costs of alternative sampling plans into FDA's import
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monitoring program. The model calculates the expected benefit of
sampling foods as a function of the risk associated with the food and
the risk reduction achievable from the monitoring. The model calcu-
lates benefit-cost ratios for sampling options and, given the resource
constraints, recommends a list of suggested samples to be taken
daily or more frequently. The model has been operationalized in a
computer system, the FDA sampling aid, that accesses the relevant
available information. The sampling aid will help inspectors select
food lots to sample, improve the allocation of FDA resources, and
improve the reliability of estimated violation rates.
Although the model was specifically developed to fit FDA's
regulatory requirements and available data about imported foods,
many of its components are applicable to other situations in which a
decision is made to reduce risk cost-effectively. For example, the
risks of injury from unsafe products might be reduced by better
enforcement of product safety laws or by an effective public educa-
tion campaign. Similarly, the risk of illness from contaminated meat
and poultry might be reduced more cost-effectively by risk-based
monitoring of slaughter and processing operations or fast-food
restaurants. The type of model described here can be used to ana-
lyze such choices for their comparative cost-effectiveness.
The remainder of this article describes the model and Us applica-
tion to FDA's import monitoring program. First, the authors provide
an overview of the analytical structure of the model. Next, they
describe how the model calculates the expected benefits of sampling.
Then they describe the calculations of expected cost and describe the
resource constraint. The following section describes how the benefit-
cost ratios are used to develop a risk-weighted sampling plan subject
to the resource constraint. They then describe their application of
the model and implementation at FDA. In the final section, they
summarize the discussion and other potential applications.
MODEL OVERVIEW
The objective of the risk-based monitoring model is to maximize
consumers' welfare gained from the regulatory monitoring program,
subject to resource constraints. Figure 1 shows the main components
of the analytic structure of the model. It combines the expected
benefit with the cost to calculate benefit-cost ratios which are then
used as weights in a random sampling design. The resource con-
straint limits the number of samples chosen for inspection.
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We assume that the decisionmaker is risk-neutral and indifferent
to choices between an action that produces a small benefit for a
large number of people and an action that produces a large benefit
for a small number of people. The total benefit is simply the sum of
the benefits to individuals. The decisionmaker will base the sampling
decision on the net expected benefits of sampling which is the differ-
ence between the net expected benefit of sampling and the net
expected benefit of not sampling.
The sampling decision is a constrained simultaneous maximiza-
tion problem that can be represented as an integer programming
problem. Consider a sampling plan for which a total of C dollars can
be spent over the planning period. Let i be an index variable describ-
ing all possible tests on all possible samples available (i = 1 ... n).
Denote the cost of the testing proeedure as Cj and the benefit from
that testing procedure as Uj. Let Xj represent a decision variable
where Xj = 1 implies that the test is performed and x, = 0 implies
that il is not. To find the mix of samples and tests that will maximize
the aggregate benefit for a given level of expenditure C, we must
solve the following {Equation 1):
max
Torrence, Sackett, and Thomas (1973) suggest that the ranking
of benefit-cost ratios is a valid simplification of this linear program-
ming problem. Benefit-cost ratios provide a normalized measure of
the benefit per dollar of each sampling possibility. Successively
choosing the samples with the highest benefit-cost ratios until reach-
ing the constraint provides the highest level of benefit per dollar
spent, implying that the exercise provides the highest level of benefit
for any given cost constraint.
Birch and Gafni (1992) verify that this application of cost-
effectiveness ratios is consistent with welfare economics principles
provided the following assumptions are maintained: (a) the objective
is to maximize the total value (benefit) given the resource pool and
(b) the value of a given change in health status is assumed to be of
equal value to society regardless of who receives it. These assump-
tions are reflected in Equation 1 and in the implied social welfare
function which weights each consumer's utility equally.
Because the authors needed to introduce a randomness element
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to the sampling plan, they modified the procedure suggested by
Torrence, Sackett, and Thomas (1973). The model estimates the
expected benefit of sampling in terms of the expected benefit to
society from avoiding the adverse effect of violations, estimates the
expected benefits and costs of sampling, and constructs benefit-cost
ratios for each food lot and each potential violation. Rather than
deterministrally choosing the samples with the highest benefit-cost
ratios until reaching the constraint, the model uses the benefit-cost
ratios as sample weights in a probability-based sampling algorithm
used to select samples until all available resources have been com-
mitted.
This procedure has an important advantage for the FDA import
monitoring program: each food lot/violation combination has a
positive probability of being sampled. Sampling is the best source of
data regarding the risk of the product. A positive sampling probabili-
ty enables the model to update the product-specific data used to
rank the food lots. In addition, this feature is a strong deterrent to
importers trying to "game" the system; because each food lot has a
positive probability of being sampled, importers cannot take actions
to ensure that their products will not be sampled.
EXPECTED BENEFIT OF SAMPLING
The expected benefit of regulatory sampling, as shown in Figure
2, depends upon the probability of a violation, the probability of
detecting the violation if the sampling procedure takes place and the
expected benefit of avoiding the adverse effects of the violation. This
algorithm assumes that benefits occur only when the regulation of
concern is violated and when these violations are detected. For
example, the objective of FDA's import monitoring program is to
reduce or eliminate welfare losses resulting from consumption of
products that violate the FD&C Act. Thus, the net expected benefit
of sampling is (Equation 2):
E[UJ = P[V] • P[D] • U (2)
where
P(V] = the probability of violation (1-P[V] is the probability of
no violation);
P[D] = the probability o detection (1-P[D] is the probability of a
false negative); and
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U = the value of consumers' welfare loss if the violation occurs.
Probability of Violation. The probability of a violation depends
on the specific regulation being considered. For example, the proba-
bility of a plant violating an environmental regulation might depend
on the plant's industry, its location, the vintage of its equipment, and
its history of environmental compliance. In the case of FDA's import
program, the probability of a violation depends theoretically on the
condition under which the food is grown, processed, and distributed.
Because FDA import inspectors cannot observe these conditions
directly, they must rely on other indications that an imported food
violates the FD&C Act. These observable characteristics include the
type of food, preparation techniques and packaging, country of
origin, and the manufacturer. Given these characteristics, the
product has a sampling history that the authors incorporate into the
model by continually updating violation probabilities in response to
laboratory results of samples tested for violation. The mode! updates
the violation probability based on recent test results, given a prior
belief about the product's violation probability (Equation 3):
J^ (3)
where
= current probability of violation;
= number of samples found to be violative in the past;
= number of samples analyzed in the past;
= likelihood of the recent test results given the current
violation probability, P[Vj]; and
^f^Ht-1 ~ likelihood of violation in the last period.
In Equation 3, P[Sj^J is a binomial probability of observing c
defectives out of n samples, given the expected population propor-
tion of defectives, P[Vjj,]. The updated violation probability be-
comes a weighted average of the prior violation probability and the
most recent sample tests results. The total number of past test re-
sults, n, can be limited so that the violation probability is weighted
toward recent sample results. Nonetheless, the current violation
probability always contains information on past sample results
because it is computed using these prior results.
Probability of Detection. The second element of sampling benefit
is the probability of detecting a violation. Depending on the specific
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regulatory and monitoring circumstances, the probability of detec-
tion depends on two factors: acceptance error and testing error.
Acceptance error occurs when the sampling action does not select a
violative sample. For example, consider an inspection of a plant by
an Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspec-
tor. If the plant is prone to violation but those violations do not
occur at the specific date and time of inspection, the violation will
not be detected due to acceptance error. Similarly, if an imported
food lot contains an illegal substance but the specific sample pulled
for inspection does not {i.e., some cans in a lot contain a violation
but not the specific can that was pulled for sampling), acceptance
error prevents detection.
The probability of testing error depends on the specific test's
ability to detect a violation. Even if a sample with a violation is
drawn (or the plant is visited on a day and during a time when a
violation occurs), the violation may not be detected because the
laboratory tests were inaccurate (or the inspector may miss a viola-
tion in his inspection). Conversely, a laboratory test could return
positive results for a violation when testing a sample that does not
contain a violation {i.e., false positive).
The authors assume that the probability of acceptance error and
the probability of testing error are independent. They also implicitly
assume no false positive test results (these would primarily affect the
welfare of producers whose welfare the authors do not consider in
this model). Therefore, the authors multiply the probabilities to
obtain an overall measure of the probability of detecting a violative
food lot; that is (Equation 5):
P[D] = (1-P , )P , (5)
where
P[D] = probability of detecting a violation;
P^ = probability of acceptance error (observing a
nonvioiative portion of a violative sample; and
Pj = probability of an accurate test result.
An operating characteristic (OC) curve expresses the probability
of acceptance error. This curve plots the probabihty of accepting a
food lot of a specified quality, P^ by the proportion of violative units
in a violative food lot, P. FDA constructs OC curves when designing
sampling plans. From these OC curves, we can determine the
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probability of accepting a violative lot, P^ for each product and each
contaminant in relation to the proportion of units, P, believed to be
violative in violative food lots.
Two factors determine the accuracy of a test of the amount of
contaminants in a food sample: the bias indicates the amount of the
contaminants in the food sample and the precision which indicates
the variability in test results when a test is performed repeatedly.
The authors consider both bias and precision in determining the
probability that an accurate test will be returned from the lab.
Expected Benefit from Avoiding Adverse Effects of Violations.
The final element in quantifying the expected benefit of monitoring
is the benefit to individuals from avoiding the potential adverse
effects of violations. These benefits will depend on the regulatory
situation and the adverse effects of violations. In the case of FD&C
Act violations, the adverse effects of violations can include immedi-
ate and delayed health effects as well as economic losses {i.e.,
economic welfare losses due to short-count, short-weight or species
substitution). Below the authors briefly describe their calculations to
illustrate the factors that must be considered in the calculation of
similar welfare effects for other types of regulatory violations such as
violation of environmental, worker health and safety or product
safety regulations.
Adverse Health Effects. The model computes the dollar value of
consumers' expected benefits form avoiding adverse health effects
for a single sdolation by multiplying the value of welfare loss from a
case of illness by the expected number of cases attributable to the
violation (Equation 6):
U, = S^ !:„ (Qj^ • Vj J (6)
where
Uj = expected benefit from avoiding adverse health effects
associated with violation i measured in dollars;
Cj- = expected number of cases of illness j and severity m at-
tributable to violation;
V-^ = dollar value of a case of illness j of severity m;
i = index parameter indicating violation;
j = index of illness from violation; and
m = index of severity of illness j (mild, moderate, severe).
This is an ex post approach to estimating benefits. While recent
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studies {e.g., Berger et ai, 1987) have demonstrated conceptual and
empirical problems with this approach, \i is still the predominant
method for valuing health effects because ex ante analysis poses
difficulties in gathering data about risk preference.
The authors* application of the model uses estimates of the value
of avoiding a case of illness IV- ) that were developed for a previous
FDA study {Mauskopf eC ai, 1988) which developed estimates of
welfare losses for mild, moderate, and severe cases of most illnesses
resulting from violations of the FD&C Act.
The expected cases of illness attributable to a violation of the
FD&C Act depends on several factors including the volume of the
food lot, the average concentration of a contaminant in a violative
shipment, the average serving size, the pathogenicity of the violative
substance, and the proportion of these factors to calculate the ex-
pected number of mild, moderate, and severe cases of illness. The
data and algorithm used to calculate each of these elements of the
model are fully described by Martin et ai, (1993).
Economic Losses. Packages that are mislabeled in violation of
the FD&C Act can cause economic losses for consumers because
they contain less product than advertised (short-weight or short-
count violations) or because they contain a product different from
that identified on the package. The authors estimate the value of
mislabeling violations for short-weight and short-count using an
economic model to estimate the value of the loss to the consumer
(Figure 4).
For example, the value of the economic loss of a short-weight
product is the per-serving-volume price of the product (P^ )^ multi-
plied by the amount that the serving was short-weight (Q^-Oj) which
equals area A plus any additional loss in consumer surplus (area B).
If the content of a food product is mislabclcd or misrepresented
(species or ingredient substitution), the value of the economic loss to
the consumer is calculated from the difference in value between the
product represented by the label and the product that is actually
contained in the misrepresented package.
Estimating the Costs of Monitoring
The cost of regulatory monitoring depends on the specific proce-
dure developed for that regulatory agency. In the case of the FDA
import monitoring program, these costs include the cost of drawing
a sample, shipping a sample, and testing the sample. The model
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estimates the costs of sampling in terms of laboratory hours required
for the test. Although this method ignores potential differences in
material costs that may be unrelated to laboratory hours required, it
does represent labor costs that are proportioned to the laboratory
hours required. Furthermore, expressing cost in terms of laboratory
hours is consistent with the measure of the resource constraint.
Estimating the Constraint. Each regulatory agency faces re-
source constraints in monitoring for regulatory violations and these
must be included in the model for the purpose of determining the
number of observations or samples that can be taken. The con-
straints the agency faces may include the monitoring budget, the
current capacity for inspections, current laboratory facilities or the
time within which inspections must be completed.
For the application to FDA's import monitoring program, the
authors limited the number of imported food lots selected for sam-
pling in a 24-hour period. Ideally, to estimate this constraint, the
authors would determine the capacity of each laboratory servicing
each district in terms of hours and compute the average number of
hours required to analyze imported foods for different types of viola-
tions. The model would then select samples one at a time, keep a
running tally of the number of laboratory hours allocated, and stop
selecting samples when the total number of laboratory hours allocat-
ed equals the laboratory hours constraint.
With this basic method in mind, the authors tailored the con-
straint algorithm to correspond to the established protocols of
FDA's testing laboratories and to the availability of data about
laboratory capacity.
Benefit-Cost Ratios and Sampling Probabilities
The primary goal of the monitoring model is to select samples so
that, in the long run, the regulatory agency minimizes adverse social
consequences arising from regulatory violations. In the case of the
PDA imported food monitoring program, a secondary goal of the
monitoring model is to collect data that can be used to make statisti-
cally valid inferences about violation rates of imported food
products. The model uses this information to calculate the probabili-
ty of violation for specific food lots.
The model uses Poisson probability-based sampling to select
samples for testing which are selected by a randomization procedure
with known probabilities of selection proportional to their benefit-
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cost ratios. As a result, the model is more likely to select samples
with high benefit-cost ratios. This approach is designed to achieve
the greatest level of benefit from the sampling plan given the avail-
able resources.
Probability-based sampling will enable regulatory agencies to
make statistically valid inference to the actual violation rates and to
state conclusions based on this inference in concise, easily under-
stood terms {e.g., with 95 percent certainty less than X percent of the
bananas imported to the U.S. during 1992 was found to violate the
FD&C Act).
To achieve this powerful inferential capability, the data collec-
tion method must satisfy two basic statistical tenets: (1) the potential
violator must be assigned a nonzero probability of selection and (b)
the randomized selection procedure must use the probability as-
signed to each potential violator. These requirements enable the
assigned probability structure to provide a link between the sample
and the population from which it is drawn.
Implementation of the Sampling Aid
For FDA's import monitoring program, the authors programmed
the model into a database capable of receiving data from FDA's
import automation system. The model uses all of the information
available for the day's scheduled imports and recommends a sam-
pling plan.
Quantitative decision methods for the complex task of regulatory
monitoring cannot replace the accumulated skill and experience of
inspectors and other regulatory authorities. Therefore, the authors
recommend that inspectors use the sampling model in conjunction
with discretionary sampling.
For example, if agencies allocate, say, 70 percent of monitoring
resources to samples chosen by the model, the original model con-
straint (the number of laboratory hours available to analyze sam-
ples) is multiplied by 0.7 leaving 30 percent of sampling resources
available to the inspectors' discretion. Inspectors can use these
remaining sampling resources to meet the sampling requirements of
compliance programs and to act on import alerts that are not con-
sidered by the sampling aid. The optimum proportion of discretion-
ary sampling depends on the amount of information that cannot be
processed by the sampling aid and must therefore be acted on at the
inspector's discretion.
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SUMMARY
Regulatory agencies face resource constraints in their efforts to
prevent regulatory violations by monitoring potential violations. To
maximize the effectiveness of these resources, the authors developed
a mode! that assists decisionmakers in following a monitoring strate-
gy that maximizes consumer welfare subject to a resource constraint.
The model estimates the expected benefit of monitoring based
on the losses avoided when violations are detected and eliminated.
The model includes the costs of monitoring and calculates benefit-
cost for each potential violation and uses these ratios to weight the
samples in a probability-based sampling scheme. The sampling plan
recommends samples and tests can be augmented by discretionary
samples chosen by inspectors on the basis of their experience and
other factors that eannot be quantified by the model.
Although some components of the model are specific to FDA's
data availability and regulatory needs, the basic structure of this
mode! is applicable to a number of regulatory situations. For exam-
ple, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could employ
a similar model to target its effluent or hazardous material monitor-
ing activities to firms that have greater probability of violation and
that discharge effluents with the most serious health consequences.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Safety and
Inspection Services has experimented with risk-based inspection
frequency for meat and poultry processing and, although USDA has
constructed a compliance database to support this effort, it has not
implemented an explicit model of the benefits and costs of inspec-
tion.
As the computer application of this model is further developed
and tested for FDA's import monitoring program, applications to
other regulatory areas will become apparent. Given the need to use
government resources efficiently, risk-based monitoring is likely to
gain acceptance once the effectiveness of such a model is demon-
strated.
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